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1 See CRS Report RL32857, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: Issues
for Congress, by Sharon Squassoni and Carl E. Behrens.
2 Nuclear safeguards is the system of inspections and reports for detecting and deterring that
nuclear material is not diverted for use in nuclear weapons.  For non-nuclear weapon state parties
to the NPT, this is formalized in full-scope safeguards agreements based on the model agreement,
Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153).
3 The exact language of the treaty is not used here for purposes of brevity, but the reader should
refer to the treaty text, available at [http://www.npt2005.org]. 
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Summary
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet
in May 2005 in New York to review implementation.  Since the last review conference
in 2000, the biggest issue to emerge is treaty compliance, particularly Iran’s compliance.
President Bush has remarked that “NPT Parties must take strong action to confront the
threat of noncompliance with the NPT...We cannot allow rogue states that violate their
commitments...to undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international
security.”  However, some NPT parties are adamant that the United States and other
nuclear weapon states are not complying with their own obligations, namely, to pursue
nuclear disarmament.  This report, which will be updated as needed, discusses different
views and issues related to NPT compliance. 
At the May 2005 NPT Review Conference, state parties undoubtedly will discuss
treaty compliance, but the shape of that discussion is uncertain.1  The United States has
argued for almost two years that Iran’s noncompliance with the NPT should be referred
to the U.N. Security Council.  The United States has argued that Iran is violating not just
its nuclear safeguards agreement, but also its obligation under Article II of the treaty to
foreswear nuclear weapons.2  At the same time, some of the non-nuclear weapon states
have argued that the United States has not complied with Article VI of the treaty, which
calls on parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.3  Some
nations may also raise questions about “compliance” with Article IV of the treaty, which
calls for technology sharing for peaceful uses of nuclear energy “in conformity with
articles I and II” of the treaty.  The parties may discuss proposed measures to further
restrict non-nuclear weapon states’ access to sensitive nuclear processes like uranium
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enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, in light of Iran’s undeclared enrichment program
and Pakistani A.Q. Khan’s black market sales of uranium enrichment technology to Iran,
North Korea, and Libya.4  This report discusses different views of NPT compliance.
Background
The NPT entered into force in 1970, when expectations of the growth of both nuclear
energy and nuclear weapons were particularly high.  Under the treaty, non-nuclear weapon
states agree to give up pursuit of nuclear weapons, but not their pursuit of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.  The main obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states are to
foreswear nuclear weapons (Article II), submit to IAEA safeguards inspections (Article
III), and not supply certain nuclear-related  items unless they are under safeguards (Article
III).  The main obligations of the nuclear weapon states are not to transfer or help non-
nuclear weapon states acquire nuclear weapons (Article I), not to supply certain nuclear-
related  items unless they are under safeguards (Article III), to facilitate the exchange of
peaceful nuclear energy technology (Article IV), and to pursue negotiations toward
nuclear disarmament (Article VI).
The bifurcation of states into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” has led, at times, to
opposing views on many aspects of treaty implementation.  In the area of compliance,
some states would like to focus on whether the nuclear weapon states are complying with
Articles IV (technical cooperation) and VI (nuclear disarmament) of the treaty.  Other
states would like to focus on whether the non-nuclear weapon states are complying with
Articles II (obligation not to develop or receive nuclear weapons) and III (safeguards). 
The NPT itself is silent on how to assess compliance, how to resolve compliance
disputes, and what procedures to follow in the event of non-compliance.  Specifically,
there is no verification of the obligations in Articles I and II not to transfer or receive
nuclear weapons.5  The treaty contains no language on verification other than to require
states to accept nuclear safeguards (Article III).  The Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on safeguards implementation every year, and
sometimes on specific compliance issues at Board of Governors meetings.  In terms of
Articles IV and VI, the treaty offers no definitions or ways of assessing whether states are
living up to their obligations.  Nuclear weapon states, in the past, have provided
information about their nuclear cooperation efforts, their contributions to the IAEA’s
technical cooperation program, and descriptions of their efforts toward nuclear
disarmament.  At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed to what have
become known as the “13 Practical Steps” toward disarmament, but the United States has
since withdrawn its support for those steps.6  NPT member states may seek to further
clarify obligations in Articles IV and VI at the May 2005 Review Conference.
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Compliance vs. Verification
All arms control treaties have obligations, but not all have verification measures —
i.e., measures that help nations monitor activities and assess compliance with treaty
obligations.  The Biological Weapons Convention, on the one hand, obligates parties not
to develop, produce or stockpile biological agents or toxins, but contains no verification
measures, while the Chemical Weapons Convention spells out verification measures in
detail.  Under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union
relied on  national technical means (e.g., satellite and overflight photography) to verify
compliance. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty referred to both
national technical means and on-site inspections, and created a Verification Commission
to resolve disputes.
As noted above, the NPT requires comprehensive nuclear safeguards for non-nuclear
weapon states.  The purpose of the safeguards is to verify “the fulfillment of [a state’s]
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”7
Safeguards, briefly, refer to  a system of inspections, reports and accounting procedures
designed to detect discrepancies between what a state reports and what inspectors find.8
There are no publicly available guidelines for determining how serious a safeguards
violation might be; there is no automatic translation from safeguards violations into NPT
violations.9  This may help explain why the IAEA has found many discrepancies, but has
not yet formally found Iran to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.
Article XII of the IAEA Statute contains procedures for reporting non-compliance:
...The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall
thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon
the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds
to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to
the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.  In the event of
failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a
reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct
curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member,
and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient
member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX,
suspend any non- complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership.10
A key issue for many NPT member states has been the lack of procedures for the
U.N. Security Council to follow in the event of NPT noncompliance.  U.S. Ambassador
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Jackie Wolcott Sanders offered this view of what the U.N. Security Council could do with
respect to Iran in a statement to the Board of Governors in March 2005:
While the IAEA must continue to have a role in investigating Iran’s past and ongoing
nuclear activities and in monitoring its suspension pledge, the Security Council has
the... authority to require and enforce a suspension of Iran’s enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities. In each of these areas, the Security Council can support and
reinforce the IAEA’s ability to pursue its investigations in Iran until the Agency can
provide this Board with all the necessary assurances it requires.11 
One precedent for handling non-compliance, although not necessarily a model one,
is the case of North Korea.  In February 1993, the IAEA Director General requested a
special inspection, which the DPRK refused.  The IAEA Board of Governors concluded
on April 1, 1993 that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and
referred the matter to the UN Security Council. On May 11, 1993, the Council called upon
the DPRK to comply with the agreement.  Although North Korea announced it would
withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993, it suspended its withdrawal in June.  Ten
years later, on February 12, 2003, the Board of Governors once again declared North
Korea in further non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and referred the
matter to the Security Council. The Board called upon North Korea to “remedy urgently”
its non-compliance, and fully cooperate with the Agency.  North Korea stated it would
withdraw from the NPT on January 11, 2003, and its official status is uncertain.12
Assessing Compliance
Articles I, II.  In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Report to Congress (Section 601
report) for 2004, the U.S. Secretary of State described Iran as violating “its Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, required under NPT Article III, and...its NPT Article II
nonproliferation obligations.”13  This U.S. position is not an “official” finding of the
IAEA; the United States has used a different standard than the IAEA in assessing Iran’s
compliance.  Some recent press reports have created confusion on the scope of IAEA
responsibilities in terms of verifying the NPT.  In particular, the Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei has stated several times that in the case of certain states, he has no
evidence of nuclear weapons programs.  While those statements are certainly correct, it
may erroneously lead observers to conclude that the IAEA must find evidence of a nuclear
weapons program before calling a state into noncompliance.  However, it is clear that in
the case of North Korea, as described above, the IAEA may report when a state does not
take action to resolve safeguards compliance disputes.  The case of Iran differs
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significantly from that of North Korea in that Iran continues to cooperate, albeit not as
fully or as quickly as many would like.  The case of Libya, where officials turned over
documents proving it sought nuclear weapons, may be an exception, rather than the rule.14
 
One U.S. official has suggested that “compliance with Article II requires that
non-nuclear-weapon states undertake no activities designed to develop a nuclear weapons
capability” and that there should be sufficient transparency in their activities to
demonstrate peaceful intent.15  It is not clear, however, who would reach a verdict of
insufficient transparency or how transparency could be measured.
Article IV.  In addition to stating the inalienable right of all parties to pursue
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Article IV says that
 All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Parties to the
Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with
other States or international organizations to the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of
non-nuclear-weapon states  Party to the treaty, with due consideration for the needs
of the developing areas of the world.
There are no standards for measuring whether NPT parties are meeting their Article IV
obligations to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
information.  During treaty negotiations, the conventional wisdom was that the NPT
would provide “a favorable basis for the spread of peaceful nuclear technology,” and the
United States recognized in Article IV a “commitment to action by nuclear Powers...to
contribute.16  However, that cooperation must also be in conformity with the Articles I and
II obligations not to develop, manufacture, or transfer nuclear weapons technology.  While
states such as Iran have argued that sanctions on cooperation with Iran violate Article IV
of the treaty, U.S. and other officials have argued that Iran’s peaceful nuclear energy
program is violating Article II of the treaty, and thus cooperation should be halted.
Article VI.  As in the case of Article IV, there are no measures in the NPT to verify
compliance with the Article VI obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.”   In 1967, U.S. negotiators argued that “it would not
be feasible to incorporate specific obligations [toward disarmament] in the treaty itself.
The differences that have prevented agreement on these measures have not yet been
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resolved.”17  The 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences identified “practical” steps toward
disarmament but there are still disagreements about the legal status of those steps and
their implications for non-compliance.18  Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker
remarked in April 2005 that “the 13 steps do not encapsulate the obligations of Article VI
in the NPT.  The obligations of Article VI are encapsulated in Article VI.”19  The United
States has reported on Article VI implementation,20 highlighting those steps it has taken
to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in its deployed forces.  Other states, however,
complain of U.S. noncompliance because the United States continues to conduct research
and development on new types of nuclear weapons and, as yet, has not accepted much
deeper reductions in its nuclear forces.
Issues for Congress
In the U.S. view, “the most important challenge facing the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty is the threat of noncompliance.”21  As President Bush stated recently that 
NPT Parties must take strong action to confront the threat of noncompliance with the
NPT in order to preserve and strengthen the Treaty’s nonproliferation undertakings. We
cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international
community to undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international
security. We must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear
materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.22
The 109th Congress continues to be  active in its oversight of nuclear nonproliferation
programs, budgets, and policies. With respect to NPT compliance, two bills have been
introduced: H.Con.Res. 133, “Non-Proliferation Treaty Enhancement Resolution of
2005,” which urges universal adoption of safeguards-strengthening measures and
implementation of disarmament steps, and H.R. 665, “Omnibus Nonproliferation and
Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2005,” which calls upon the President to report to
Congress on the viability of measures to close what the bill’s proponents  perceive as the
Article IV “loophole” of peaceful nuclear energy programs to disguise military programs.
